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I. INTRODUCTION
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act,' as
amended by the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act'
(hereinafter referred to collectively as the "Affordable Care Act"
or "PPACA"), has been heralded' as the most important set of
changes to American health insurance since the 1965 enactment
of Medicare' and Medicaid.5 Building on the public and private
health insurance coverage systems in existence at the time of pas-
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and Affordable Care Act's insurance reforms in the context of persons with
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1. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124
Stat. 119 (2010) (to be codified as amended in scattered sections of 25 U.S.C.,
26 U.S.C., 29 U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C.) [hereinafter PPACA].
2. Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No.
111-152, 124 Stat. 1029 (to be codified as amended in scattered sections of 20
U.S.C., 26 U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C.). For ease of reference, PPACA as used here
will include the Amendments made by the Reconciliation Act.
3. See President Barack Obama, Remarks at the Signing of the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act (Mar. 23, 2010), available at http://
www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-and-vice-president-
signing-health-insurance-reform-bill.
4. Health Insurance for the Aged (Medicare) Act, Pub. L. No. 89-97,
§§ 101-02, 79 Stat. 286, 290-332 (1965) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 426, 1395-139511).
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sage,' the PPACA nonetheless makes sweeping reforms with an
eye toward achieving near-universal health insurance coverage by
2019.' Coverage reforms, the most important of which take
effect January 1, 2014, intend to eliminate Medicaid's historic
exclusion of low-income adults who are neither pregnant, dis-
abled, nor extremely poor parents of minor children.' Other
PPACA reforms have as their goal to improve the scope and qual-
ity of coverage in the individual health insurance market as well
as in the group health benefit markets, whether fully insured or
self-insured.9 In addition, the PPACA establishes state health
insurance exchanges, which are scheduled to become opera-
tional byJanuary 1, 2014,10 and whose purpose is to make quality
and affordable coverage accessible to individuals and small
5. Medicaid Act, Pub. L. No. 89-97, §§ 1901-05, 79 Stat. 286, 343-53
(1965) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396-1396d).
6. Christine Eibner, Peter S. Hussey & Federico Girosi, The Effects of the
Affordable Care Act on Workers' Health Insurance Coverage, 363 NEw ENG. J. MED.
1393, 1393 (2010). As of 2009, non-elderly Americans derived their coverage as
follows: Medicaid and the Children's Health Insurance Program (CHIP)
(17%); other public insurance (3%); employer-sponsored insurance (57%);
and individually purchased private health insurance coverage (5%). Some 19%
of all persons were uninsured that year. Of this number, an estimated 81%
were citizens or lawfully present in the U.S. See Kaiser State Health Facts:
Nonelderly (0-64), THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., http://www.statehealth
facts.org/comparebarjsp?cat=3&ind=126 (last visitedJune 9, 2010); see also THE
HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., THE UNINSURED: A PRIMER, KEY FACTS ABOUT
AMERICANS WITHOUT HEALTH INSURANCE (2010), http://www.kff.org/unin
sured/upload/7451-06.pdf.
7. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimates that by 2019, the
number of non-elderly uninsured individuals would be reduced by 32 million.
The number of non-elderly individuals without insurance would thus decrease
to 23 million, approximately one-third of whom are unauthorized immigrants.
Put differently, by 2019 the percentage of legal, non-elderly individuals with
health insurance would increase to 94%. See Letter from Douglas Elmendorf,
Director, Cong. Budget Office, to Nancy Pelosi, Speaker of the House, U.S.
House of Representatives 9 (Mar. 20, 2010), available at http://www.cbo.gov/
ftpdocs/113xx/docl1379/AmendReconProp.pdf.
8. PPACA, Pub. L. No. 111-148, §§ 2001(a)(1)(C), 2002(a), 124 Stat. 119,
150-51, 158-59 (2010). See generally DAVID G. SMITH &JUDITH D. MOORE, MEDI-
CAID POLITICS AND POLICY" 1967-2007 (2008); ROBERT STEVENS & ROSEMARY STE-
VENS, WELFARE MEDICINE IN AMERICA: A CASE STUDY OF MEDICAID (2003).
9. See PPACA §§ 1001, 1201, 124 Stat. at 130-38, 154-61. These provi-
sions are applied to Employee Retirement Income Security Act-governed health
plans, including self-insured plans by § 1563. Examples of reforms include bar-
ring the use of pre-existing condition exclusions, excessive waiting periods,
elimination of annual and lifetime limits on coverage, comprehensive coverage
of certain preventive services, coverage of routine health care furnished as part
of clinical trials, and a prohibition against rescissions. Id.
10. Id. § 1311(b) (1), 124 Stat. at 173.
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employer groups.u Finally, the PPACA makes improvements in
Medicare coverage' 2 and payment structures,' 3 seeks to stimulate
greater efficiencies and higher quality in health care delivery,14
and addresses challenges in population health,' health care
access,16 long-term care,' 7 and the health workforce.18
This Article focuses on one particular slice of the Act,
namely, the provision that establishes federal standards for cover-
age of "essential health benefits" in the state-regulated individual
and small group health insurance markets. Historically, regula-
tion of the content of coverage within these two markets has
been the virtually exclusive purview of state insurance law.' 9
11. Id. § 1311, 124 Stat. at 173-81. For a general overview of health insur-
ance exchanges, see TIMOTHY STOLTZFUS JOST, THE COMMONWEALTH FUND,
PUBL'N No. 1426, HEALTH INSURANCE EXCHANGES AND THE AFFORDABLE CARE
AcT: KEY POLICY ISSUES (2010), http://www.commonwealthfund.org/-/media/
Files/Publications/Fund%20Report/2010/Jul/1426Jost-hlt insurance_
exchanges ACA.pdf.
12. See PPACA §§ 3001-08, 124 Stat. 353-78.
13. See id. §§ 3131-43, 124 Stat. at 427-42.
14. See, e.g., id. § 3022, 124 Stat. at 395-99 (shared savings arrangements
through accountable care organizations); id. § 3201, 124 Stat. at 442-54
(Center for Medicare and Medicaid Innovation); id. §§ 3011-3015, 124 Stat. at
378-89 (National Strategy to Improve Health Care Quality).
15. Id. §§ 4001-4402, 124 Stat. at 538-88.
16. See, e.g., id. § 10503, 124 Stat. at 1004 (Community Health Centers
and National Health Service Corps Fund); id. § 10801, 124 Stat. at 1015.
17. See, e.g., id. § 10202, 124 Stat. at 923-27 (incentives to offer home and
community-based long-term care services).
18. Id. §§ 10501-10609, 124 Stat. at 993-1015.
19. The federal government has not been without a presence in the state-
regulated individual and group health insurance markets, as laws such as the
Public Health Service Act standards for coverage enacted through the Health
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, the Mental Health Parity Act, and
other laws discussed in this Article indicate. At the same time, states historically
have borne the vast responsibility for the content and structure of health insur-
ance products sold in the group and individual markets. See Metro. Life Ins.
Co. v Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724 (1985); THE HENRYJ. KAISER FAMILY FOUND.,
How PRIVATE HEALTH COVERAGE WORKs: A PRIMER, 2008 UPDATE 8-20 (2008),
http://www.kff.org/insurance/upload/7 766.pdf. For an analysis of the eco-
nomic effects of state health insurance mandates on the cost of individual cov-
erage, see MICHAEL J. NEW, HERITAGE FOUND., THE EFFECT OF STATE
REGULATIONS ON HEALTH INSURANCE PREMIUMS: A REVISED ANALYSIS (2006),
available at http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2006/0 7 /the-effect-of-
state-regulations-on-health-insurance-premiums-a-revised-analysis (follow
"Download PDF" hyperlink). The study, which not surprisingly, finds a signifi-
cant impact of mandates in the individual market, focuses on mandated bene-
fits, health plan liability laws, laws regulating direct access to specialists, and
laws addressing provider due process. In the author's view, the concept of a
mandate extends well beyond the benefit, coverage design, and utilization man-
agement and reaches matters of fair process for members and providers and
5292011]1
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Because small group plans are only rarely self-insured2 0 and thus
only rarely exempt from state insurance regulatory law under
Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA)' preemp-
tion principles, it is state law that has been the dominant force in
shaping the individual and small group markets. The aim of the
essential health benefit statute is no less than to extend the
impact of the PPACA beyond the threshold issue of access to any
coverage, and to introduce a federally uniform meaning to the
concept of coverage, at least in the individual and small group
markets, with a particular focus on the integrity of such coverage
for persons with disabilities and serious health conditions.
How the essential health benefit provision ultimately might
affect the structure, scope, and content of coverage within mar-
kets that the statute does not affect-larger group health markets
whether fully insured or self-insured-we cannot yet know. It
may be that the corporations that sell health benefit services
products will over time, adapt the types of reforms required for
those markets that the essential health benefit provisions affect.
Nor can we know at this point how the essential health benefit
provision will affect underlying state laws regulating the content
of health insurance in the individual and small group markets,
since federal regulations delineating the precise relationship
between the federal statute and existing state benefit mandates
had not arisen as of the time of this writing. At the same time,
the essential benefit statute reaches beyond earlier state benefit
plan liability for injuries caused by negligent or willful misconduct. But see
Jonathan Gruber, State-Mandated Benefits and Employer-Provided Health Insurance,
55 J. PUB. ECON. 433, 433 (1994) (finding that state benefit mandates have no
effect on the rate of coverage in the group health insurance market because the
mandates memorialize, rather than compel, insurer behavior in the market.
Put another way, by the time a group health mandate makes its political way
onto the books of a state's insurance code, insurers are providing the benefit
anyhow.).
20. See AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE RESEARCH & QUALITY, PERCENT OF PRI-
VATE-SECTOR ESTABLISHMENTS THAT OFFER HEALTH INSURANCE THAT SELF-INSURE
AT LEAST ONE PLAN BY FIRM SIZE AND STATE: UNITED STATES, 2009 (2009), http:/
/www.meps.ahrq.gov/mepsweb/data-stats/summ-tables/insr/state/series-2/
2009/tiia2a.pdf.
21. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-
406, 88 Stat. 829 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C. and 29
U.S.C.). ERISA preempts state laws that relate to employee health benefit plans
but saves state laws that regulate insurance. Id. § 514, 88 Stat. at 897. State laws
saved under ERISA preemption principles encompass laws that regulate benefit
design structure as well as the application of benefit design to plan participants
and beneficiaries. See Ky. Ass'n of Health Plans, Inc. v. Miller, 538 U.S. 329, 342
(2003); Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355, 366 (2002); Metro.
Life Ins. Co., 471 U.S. at 746.
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mandates, with aims to broadly address the fundamental prob-
lem of benefit and coverage design structures that result in dis-
crimination against persons with disabilities, rather than through
the more traditional approach found in existing state laws of spe-
cific treatment and benefit mandates. 2 2
As used in this Article, in most instances, the term "discrimi-
nation" does not convey the concept of invidious treatment of
individuals with disabilities;23 rather, it describes generally how
the insurance industry-with society's blessing-has been able to
expose certain populations to higher financial risks because of
their underlying health conditions, using strategies related to
both the design and administration of their products. 24 Indeed,
discrimination against persons with disabilities in the context of
health insurance coverage, through practices that utilize disabil-
ity status to determine financial risk, has long been normative
practice in the health insurance industry. The essential health
benefits statute and its anti-discrimination provision can alter this
experience for persons with disabilities.
This Article begins in Part II with a description of the types
of insurance practices that discriminate against persons with disa-
bilities, including a discussion of the reach of existing laws
addressing discrimination in insurance content and coverage.
Part II considers both public and private health insurance in this
regard. Part III analyzes the essential benefits statute in the
fuller PPACA context, and explores the implications of the stat-
ute's terms in light of the body of law on which it builds. Part IV
discusses the implications of the law for the health insurance
markets that exist alongside those that the essential health bene-
fit statute touches.
22. See COUNCIL FOR AFFORDABLE HEALTH INS., http://www.cahi.org/
index.asp (last visited June 9, 2011) (website regularly publishes newsletters on
the latest state insurance mandates).
23. We say "in most instances" because, as discussed below, there are cir-
cumstances under which discrimination in the design and administration of
health insurance can in fact constitute a civil rights law violation.
24. See SARA ROSENBAUM, THE O'NEILL INST. FOR NAT'L & GLOBAL HEALTH
LAW, GEORGETOWN UNIV., INSURANCE DISCRIMINATION ON THE BASIS OF HEALTH
STATUS: AN OVERVIEW OF DISCRIMINATION PRACTICES, FEDERAL LAw, AND FEDERAL
REFORM OMrroNs 1 (2009), http://www.law.georgetown.edu/oneillinstitute/
national-health-law/legal-solutions-in-health-reform/Papers/Discrimination.
pdf.
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II. SETTING THE CONTEXT: DISCRIMINATION IN INSURANCE
COVERAGE AGAINST PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES
A. Historical Health Insurance Access and Coverage Discrimination
Discrimination against persons with disabilities (and other
individuals insurance companies considered "uninsurable" or
"bad risks," such as the poor, the elderly, and those with chronic
illnesses) has been a historic problem in both the access to and
content of health insurance. This discrimination arose, in large
measure, out of the country's failure to enact a single, national
health insurance program. In the absence of universal coverage
premised on a social insurance model (as in the case of other
wealthy industrialized nations), the private insurance industry
entered the market incentivized by lucrative tax policies allowing
the exclusion from employee income of employers' contribution
to insurance coverage arrangements. 25 Insurance coverage thus
became tied to work, thereby excluding those whose health con-
ditions precluded employment.2 6 Moreover, insurers pursued
benefit designs calculated to cover costs associated with working
populations who did not experience serious and chronic physical
and mental health conditions that precluded work. As described
by a leading authority on the topic of discrimination against per-
sons with disabilities in health insurance and health care:
Private health insurers engage in risk-classification prac-
tices as part of their competitive strategies for capturing
profitable segments of the health insurance market while
avoiding unprofitable segments. Rather than segmenting
the market by product and competing based on product
price and quality, however, health insurers tend to seg-
ment the market by customer-competing in their efforts
to sell policies to those customers considered likely to be
profitable and to avoid customers who can be predicted to
be unprofitable.27
The U.S. approach to health insurance coverage thus started
to adhere closely to market principles, in which those who are in
relatively poor health are more likely to be uninsured or under-
insured, and where government programs exist only for popula-
tions who lay beyond the reaches of the private market, such as
25. PAUL STARR, THE SocIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE 334
(1982); David Blumenthal, Employer-Sponsored Health Insurance in the United
States-Origins and Implications, 355 NEw ENG. J. MED. 82, 83 (2006).
26. Deborah Stone, Protect the Sick: Health Insurance Reform in One Easy Les-
son, 36 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 652, 652-53 (2008).
27. Mary Crossley, Discrimination Against the Unhealthy in Health Insurance,
54 U. KAN. L. REv. 73, 82 (2005) (footnote omitted).
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the old, poor, sick, and disabled. For example, Congress created
Medicare for the elderly, and Medicaid evolved to address the
needs of the poor and those with high health bills rendered
indigent. 28
Furthering both this private market approach and the result-
ing discrimination against individuals with poor health risks is a
system in which insurers and health benefit services corporations
sell third-party-administered products primarily to large,
employed groups or healthy smaller groups, giving insurers the
advantage of large risk pools and/or relatively healthy self-
selected groups.2
Health insurance products, including, for purposes of this
Article, products sold to self-insured groups, are contracts of risk;
in order to avoid the problems of adverse selection (enrollment
by the sickest populations) and moral hazard (over-use of cov-
ered services), health insurers developed techniques for discrimi-
nating among and against higher health risks.so Health
insurance companies developed a variety of techniques at the ini-
tial enrollment phase as well as through benefit and coverage
design and plan administration to classify and, in some cases, to
completely avoid risk. For some individuals deemed "uninsur-
able" by an insurer-for example, those with an existing costly
medical condition, or perhaps just the risk factors for such a con-
dition-the result can be complete rejection of their application
for insurance coverage." Alternatively, an insurer might permit
enrollment in the insurance product but impose exclusions or
waiting periods for pre-existing conditions.
Perhaps most challenging to high-risk individuals' efforts to
obtain affordable, meaningful insurance coverage is insurers' use
of "actuarial rating," or medical underwriting. Actuarial rating is
a system of pricing insurance premiums based on an individual's
likelihood of utilizing covered medical care. Insurers determine
this likelihood by analyzing a person's risk factors, family history,
and personal medical history,3 2 and charge higher premiums for
individuals whose characteristics pose higher financial risks. In
some cases, premium rates effectively price high-risk individuals
out of the insurance market. Medical underwriting has its
28. See SMITH & MOORE, supra note 8, at 21-40 (2008); STARR, supra note
25, at 368-78.
29. See ROSENBAUM, supra note 24, at 5.
30. See TIMOTHY STOLTZFUS JOST, HEALTH CARE AT Risic A CRITIQUE OF
THE CONSUMER-DRIVEN MOVEMENT 189-91 (2007).
31. This type of absolute bar to enrollment is most common in the indi-
vidual insurance market (as opposed to large and small group markets).
32. See Stone, supra note 26, at 653.
5332011]
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strongest presence in the individual market, but has also been a
practice in the group market, although the guaranteed issue and
renewal requirements of the Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act of 1996 curbed this to some extent. 3
Actuarial rating leads to a rather perverse system of financ-
ing health care services, in which those who most need care are
those least likely to become insured, and thus the least likely to
be able to afford the care. Individuals already sick are at risk of
exclusion from the private insurance market altogether; those
people who are relatively less healthy face the prospect of higher
premiums and high cost-sharing, making insurance potentially
unaffordable; and those who show risk markers for future illness
also face higher premiums and the risk of unaffordable insur-
ance.8 4 Particularly invidious were insurer classifications based
on immutable characteristics such as race, national origin, or
gender. For example, African Americans historically have been
subject to exclusion from the insurance market and higher pre-
miums, and women traditionally have faced higher health
insurance premiums than men based on actuarial data that por-
tray a pattern of relatively high health care utilization at certain
stages of their lives."
Beyond barring enrollment in a health plan altogether and
using actuarial rating to shield themselves from high utilizers of
covered services, insurers have developed many other risk-shield-
ing strategies and tools that apply after the point of enrollment.
In the next section, we describe how these strategies and tools
are used to discriminate against high-risk individuals, including
persons with disabilities. In Part II.C below, we discuss how
existing law permits the use of these risk-shielding tools and thus
the resulting discrimination.
B. Health Insurance Design and Administration Techniques That
May Produce Discriminatory Effects Against Persons
With Disabilities
Prior to the enactment of the PPACA, the law did little to
curb disability discrimination in the design and administration of
33. See Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub.
L. No. 104-191, §§ 101-102, 110 Stat. 1936, 1955-78 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 29 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.) (amending both the Public
Health Service Act and ERISA to reach group health insurance plans whether
insured or fully insured).
34. Stone, supra note 26, at 654.
35. Crossley, supra note 27, at 85-87.
36. ROSENBAUM, supra note 24, at 4; see also Robert Pear, Women Buying
Health Policies Pay a Penalty, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 30, 2008, at A23.
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health insurance, even where it proscribed conduct that limits
disabled individuals' ability to gain health insurance itself. As a
result, insurers and health plan administrators have been free to
devise techniques that limit their financial exposure to claims of
coverage for costly benefits and services. These techniques show
up in the standard design of health plan products sold to groups
and individuals.
Insurers generally utilize two broad approaches to managing
their financial risk, each of which encompasses several specific
techniques." The first approach relates to the initial design of
their covered benefits and services. For example, a health bene-
fit plan might contain outright coverage exclusions, such that
coverage for a particular treatment or service is never available to
a health plan member, regardless of the peculiar characteristics
or needs of the individual seeking coverage. An example would
be the total exclusion of speech therapy, or speech therapy
whose defined purpose is to restore speech, which precludes its
availability to persons who need therapy to develop speech or to
maintain the ability to speak or avert the loss of speaking skills."
Another example would be use of a definition of "medical neces-
sity" that limits the scope of what can be considered necessary,
and therefore covered, to treatments and services that aid in
recovery of lost functioning. 9
Benefit design techniques might also include financial strat-
egies such as patient cost-sharing incentives that penalize the use
of costly treatments; for example, very high cost-sharing for the
use of expensive drugs that have no therapeutic equivalent
regardless of the patient's underlying need for care. Similarly,
insurers might employ physician incentive plans that encourage
providers to avoid costly patients by rewarding physicians for lim-
iting resource use, without adjusting for patient characteristics.4 0
Broad design parameters of an insurance policy apply equally to
all individuals enrolled in the plan 4 1 and effectively amount to
37. See RAND E. ROSENBLATr, SYLVIA A. LAw & SARA ROSENBAUM, LAW AND
THE AMERICAN HEALTH CARE SYSTEM 139-42 (1997).
38. Bedrick v. Travelers Ins. Co., 93 F.3d 149 (4th Cir. 1996).
39. Sara Rosenbaum & Paul Wise, Crossing the Medicaid-Private Insurance
Divide: The Case of EPSDT, 26 HEALTH AFF. 382, 386 (2007).
40. See Bruce Landon et al., Creating a Parsimonious Typology of Physician
Financial Incentives, 9 HEALTH SERVICES & OUTCOMES RES. METHODOLOGY 219
(2009) (demonstrating that one survey of the physicians shows a far greater
likelihood that physicians will report incentives to decrease rather than increase
use of resources (75% versus 25%)).
41. Decisions about how to initially design a health insurance policy are
considered "macro" decisions, given their universal application to all members
of a particular health plan.
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fixed limitations and exclusions over the kind and amount of
medical care for which the insurer will pay.4 2
The second broad approach insurers use to limit their finan-
cial exposure to medical care claims is employed after a plan has
been designed and sold to consumers, when insurers aim to man-
age how individual beneficiaries use the benefits the plan actu-
ally covers.4 3 Examples of utilization management practices, as
they are called, include insurers' decisions about whether to
approve coverage at all given their interpretation of the terms of
their plans; to approve partial coverage of a claim based on
whether the proposed treatment is, in their view, appropriate;
and to determine whether a proposed service is medically
necessary."
1. Coverage Design Techniques
Outright Exclusions and Limitations As noted above, the use of
explicit exclusions and limitations-particularly for conditions or
treatments that are costly and chronic-in the initial design of an
insurance plan is one of the most obvious and most prevalent
types of design strategies aimed at limiting insurers' financial
risk. These exclusions and limitations take several forms, all of
which have relevance in the context of disability discrimination.
Across-the-board coverage exclusions and limitations are of course
common, in which specific services or procedures go uncovered
(or uncovered to a certain extent) in all cases. For example, a
plan could exclude treatments for AIDS-related conditions alto-
gether4 5 or limit occupational therapy visits to no more than 30
annually. Treatment- or procedure-based limitations attach when, for
example, otherwise-covered speech therapy might face exclusion
when the purpose of the proposed treatment is to restore speech
to previous levels, but when the health plan member seeking cov-
erage was so young as to never have begun speaking in the first
instance." Finally, coverage exclusions and limitations may be
purpose-based. Insurers utilize purpose-based limitations to shield
themselves from financial responsibility in the case of treatments
and services that happen to have value for the claimant-for
42. See Kenseth v. Dean Health Plan, Inc., 610 F. 3d 452 (7th Cir. 2010).
43. ROSENBLATr ET AL., supra note 37, at 140-41 (referring to these utili-
zation management practices as "micro" techniques for their application to
plan members on a case-by-case basis as individuals seek coverage for services
specific to their needs and medical conditions).
44. Id.
45. Doe v. Mut. of Omaha Ins. Co., 179 F.3d 557 (7th Cir. 1999).
46. Bedrick v. Travelers Ins. Co., 93 F.3d 149, 149 (4th Cir. 1996).
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example, in an educational or social sphere-above and beyond
pure clinical value.
Embedded Treatment Guidelines- Treatment guidelines (or
clinical practice guidelines, practice parameters, clinical proto-
cols, etc.) are systematic, sometimes evidence-based statements
developed to assist clinical decision-making given a certain medi-
cal scenario or constellation of patient symptoms. 48 Insurers and
health plans also use them, however, to inform coverage deci-
sion-making. In instances where plan creators do not incorpo-
rate the guidelines into the health plan terms at the moment of
design, plan administrators use treatment guidelines merely to
aid their decisions about whether to cover a proposed treatment,
since the guidelines are not dispositive. Where plan creators do
directly write treatment guidelines into a health plan's coverage
provisions, the outcome is very different; because the guidelines
in these circumstances become part of the actual terms of cover-
age, they have the effect of delineating the full scope of coverage,
thus eliminating the possibility that an individual could receive
coverage for a service that the treatment guidelines do not
contemplate.4 9
Benefit Definitions- Even assuming in theory that an insurer
elected not to include any explicit exclusions in its health poli-
cies, plan benefits could still be severely limited through the use
of restrictive definitions pertaining to covered benefit classes, ser-
vices, and "medical necessity." For example, restricting the defi-
nition of speech therapy to "therapy needed to restore speech to
prior levels" has the effect of excluding from coverage therapy
that is potentially beneficial but nonetheless disallowed in the
case of a patient for whom a prior level of speech cannot be fully
restored, such as for a patient with muscular dystrophy seeking
therapy to prevent further deterioration of his speech. Similarly,
a plan's medical necessity definition can function in a variety of
ways with the effect of limiting benefits and services for people
with disabilities, including a construction that permits coverage
only in the event that an impairment results from "illness, injury
or disease."
47. This type of exclusion can be triggered, for example, in the case of a
child with developmental disabilities who is receiving physical therapy that both
has not just clinical value, but social value expected to result in overall improve-
ment in the child's health and functioning. See Mondry v. American Family
Mut. Ins. Co., 557 F.3d 781 (7th Cir. 2009).
48. See, e.g., INsT. OF MED., CLINICAL PRAccE GUIDELINES: DIRECTIONS
FOR A NEW PROGRAM 38 (Marilyn J. Field & Kathleen N. Lohr eds., 1990).
49. See Mondry, 557 F.3d 781; Jones v. Kodak Med. Assistance Plan, 169
F.3d 1287 (10th Cir. 1999).
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Cost-sharing Cost-sharing-whether in the form of deduct-
ibles, copayments, or coinsurance-is another technique insur-
ers use to limit their own financial exposure to claims of coverage
and to shift the risk to policyholders. As with outright coverage
exclusions, cost-sharing can apply across-the-board or only to spe-
cific conditions or treatments. Plans sometimes also "tier" their
cost-sharing responsibilities as a way of driving patients to use cer-
tain providers that, in the view of the insurer, are more "effi-
cient" in the provision of treatments and services.o The tiering
amounts to the assigning of relatively higher or lower cost-shar-
ing of one type or another to benefits and services, say, for exam-
ple, to the selection of either generic or brand-name prescription
drugs." Because cost-sharing must occur at the point of receiv-
ing a medical service or product, it has been shown to discourage
low-income sick people from seeking care.5 2 In this way, cost-
sharing may be a more effective technique than actuarial rating
for discriminating against people in poor health."
Physician Network Size and Composition: Because the size and
composition of both primary and specialty physician networks
affect patient utilization of services, network size and composi-
tion affect an insurer's financial risk. While insurers will some-
times exclude physicians altogether from networks as a way of
steering patients away from their services, insurers and health
plans more recently have sought blunter, more value-based
approaches to incentivizing the use of higher quality physicians,
including the utilization of provider tiers.5 4 Network tiering sub-
jects some physicians' services to higher cost-sharing, with the
lowest cost-sharing reserved for health professionals whose treat-
ment outcomes the insurer views as reflecting both efficiency and
high quality. Physician tiering, and the cost-sharing associated
with it, may or may not account for those providers who treat
patients with enhanced health needs.
Provider Payments- Finally, insurers also use various incentives
to help manage provider use of resources," and thus their own
50. A. Mark Fendrick et al., Applying Value-Based Insurance Design to Low-
Value Health Services, 29 HEALTH AFF. 2017, 2017-21 (2010).
51. See, e.g., Saltzman v. Independence Blue Cross, 384 F. App'x 107, 109
(3d Cir 2010).
52. Stone, supra note 26, at 655.
53. Id.
54. See Anne B. Claiborne et al., Legal Impediments to Implementing Value-
Based Purchasing in Healthcare, 35 AM. J.L. & MED. 442, 481 (2009); Ellen
Nakashima, Doctors Rated But Can't Get a Second Opinion; Inaccurate Data About
Physicians' Performance Can Harm Reputations, WASH. PosT, July 25, 2007, at Al.
55. See Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 219 (2000); Shea v. Esensten,
107 F.3d 625, 627 (8th Cir. 1997).
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financial risk. Incentives include end-of-year bonuses, share-sav-
ings plans, and case management fees. Incentive arrangements
may or may not take into account a provider's patient mix,
including whether a provider has many patients with enhanced
health needs.
2. Utilization Management Techniques
Prospective and Concurrent Review: The second broad
approach insurers use to limit their financial exposure to medi-
cal care claims is the management of patients' utilization of ser-
vices that the health plan covers, applying the terms and
definitions embedded in the coverage documents to individual
cases whose factual issues might place the patient either within or
outside of coverage. Prospective and concurrent reviews are
processes designed to control unnecessary utilization or overuse
of covered services through, respectively, advance or simultane-
ous consideration of the medical necessity of a treatment or ser-
vice. While prospective and concurrent review are more
desirable than the traditional approach of retrospective review,
in which review of the appropriateness of the procedure at issue
occurs only after the service has been delivered, prospective and
concurrent review may result in the advance rejection or termi-
nation of coverage and thus the loss of access to healthcare."
Care Coordination and Case Management An insurer or health
plan may also either offer or require case management for
patients with particular conditions. In extreme cases, a care
coordination or management program operates more like an
embedded treatment guideline by restricting coverage to prede-
termined services, regardless of a patient's unique needs. When
designed in this fashion, "coordination" or "management" of
care is more like a coverage exclusion for a particular treatment
or condition and less like a process for tailoring covered benefits
to individual illness.5
C. Pre-Affordable Care Act Law and the Content of
Health Insurance
It is fair to say that pre-PPACA, neither state insurance laws,
nor employee benefit law, nor civil rights laws reached practices
56. ROSENBLATT ET AL., supra note 37, at 214-15; see also Bedrick v. Trav-
elers Ins. Co., 93 F.3d 149, 154 (4th Cir. 1996); Wickline v. State, 239 Cal. Rptr.
810, 820 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987).
57. See Glenn Mays et al., Convergence and Dissonance: Evolution in Private-
Sector Approaches to Disease Management and Care Coordination, 26 HEALTH AFF.
1683, 1683-84 (2007).
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aimed at discriminating against certain conditions. As noted,
state benefit mandates addressed particular treatments, like a law
mandating coverage of reconstructive surgery following a mastec-
tomy, but mandates related to isolated treatments do not make
for a broad prohibition against discrimination. Federal laws reg-
ulating employee health benefit plans similarly took an isolated,
condition-specific approach to the problem of coverage discrimi-
nation, like required minimum hospital stays for new mothers, or
mandated minimum mental illness coverage. The absence of a
broad framework for averting coverage discrimination was a pres-
ence in coverage law despite the existence of federal civil rights
laws specifically aimed at protecting persons with disabilities;
most importantly is the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA),"
whose protections have been limited to protecting against dis-
crimination in access to care itself or access to places in which
insurance is sold." The law's permissive approach to the regula-
tion of insurance design and risk avoidance stems from the fun-
damentally voluntary nature of health insurance and the
concomitant willingness of society to tolerate the types of risk
shielding devices, noted above, by insurers faced with a market
fraught with the potential for adverse selection and moral
hazard.
1. Insurance Law and Employee Benefit Law
Because health insurance has not been a requirement, insur-
ers have not been required to sell it. Furthermore, because the
concept of affordability has not been a basic aspect of health
care, insurers have been free to introduce coverage limits that
greatly reduce the value of their products in the case of individu-
als with high health needs. Thus, when insurers or employers do
elect to offer insurance products to individuals, groups, or
58. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-213 (2006).
59. See, e.g., Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 654 (1998) (prohibiting a
dentist from refusing to treat a qualified individual with a disability); Doe v.
Mut. of Omaha Ins. Co., 179 F.3d 557, 564 (7th Cir. 1999) (prohibiting insurers
from refusing to sell policies to persons with HIV who are qualified persons
with disabilities but not prohibiting an AIDS exclusion in the policy). In the
case of race and sex, civil rights law produces a different outcome where dis-
crimination in insurance design is concerned. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2006), prohibits intentional and unintentional
disproportionate impact discrimination on the basis of race, sex, or national
origin in employment and the conditions of employment (including fringe
benefits, such as health insurance). Title VII has been interpreted as prohibit-
ing the provision of lesser benefits based on race, greater financial charges
based on sex for similar benefits, and lesser-value benefits based on sex. See
Crossley, supra note 27.
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employees, they are free to decide whether to offer a product
and, if so, what its terms of design and administration will be.'o
State governments, which traditionally have regulated both insur-
ance and insurance markets, tend to do little to decisively shape
either one, out of concern that too much regulation will scare off
new insurance carriers and/or drive away existing ones.
This is not to say that states do not regulate health insurers.
Since the earliest days of insurance, states have sought to protect
insurance holders from plan insolvency and fraudulent behavior.
Thus, for example, states impose licensure requirements, capital-
ization requirements, and requirements related to medical
underwriting practices on insurers to protect plan solvency and
ensure corporate financial stability.62 States also go to some
lengths to regulate insurer conduct in relation to policyholders,
prohibiting fraudulent and deceptive behaviors by registering
and licensing insurance agents, outlawing unfair sales tactics, and
requiring fairness in claims processing and review.
Furthermore, states do in fact regulate the content of insur-
ance coverage, albeit in relatively narrow ways. Over the years
states have mandated the inclusion of coverage for numerous dis-
tinct treatments and services, singling out specific conditions or
services for required coverage. Typical examples include cover-
age of certain mental health treatments, prohibitions against
same-day discharges of mothers and newborns, coverage of cer-
tain reproductive health items and services, and other treatments
that either suffer from acute market failure or that wider society
accepts as redeeming. However, for the most part, state law
leaves enormous discretion to the insurance industry, including
the discretion over plan design.
Federal laws, including both the Public Health Service Act"
and the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA),"
have been similarly circumspect when it comes to intervening in
plan design. While ERISA establishes disclosure, information,
and fiduciary obligations with respect to plan administration, its
provisions related to the content of coverage are few. Congress
has amended ERISA over time to address discrimination against
certain types of patients and conditions, such as reconstructive
60. See McGann v. H & H Music Co., 946 F.2d 401, 408 (5th Cir. 1991).
61. For a lengthy discussion of the rise and evolution of health insurance
and its regulation, see ROSENBLATE ET AL., supra note 37, at 139-71.
62. Id. at 142-44.
63. Pub. L. No. 78-410, 58 Stat. 682 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 201-300jj).
64. Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 951 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C.
§§ 1001-1461).
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treatment following breast cancer and disparities in the treat-
ment of persons with mental illness and addiction disorders."5 In
the end, however, ERISA generally accords employers broad dis-
cretion in health benefit plan design."
2. Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1974 ("Section
504")67 prohibits discrimination against "qualified handicapped
persons"" on the basis of an individual's disability in any pro-
gram or activity that receives federal financial assistance. Under
Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act," which prohibits discrimi-
nation on the basis of race, color, or national origin by any entity
receiving federal financial assistance, "contract[s] of insurance"
have been exempt from the reach of the term "Federal financial
assistance."7 0 This means that in the absence of other laws
extending the term to reach insurance and tax subsidies to sup-
port insurance, the provisions of Section 504 would not extend
to the private market. However, cases involving the application
of Section 504 to public health insurance underscore the limited
reach of disability law to protect qualified persons with handi-
caps, at least where the content and administration of health
insurance are concerned.
Alexander v. Choate"l involved a lawsuit by a class of Medicaid
recipients with disabilities who challenged Tennessee's decision
to reduce Medicaid-coverage for inpatient hospital care from
twenty to fourteen days. Among other claims, beneficiaries
alleged that the reduction violated Section 504 because its effect
was to discriminate on the basis of disability, given the compara-
65. See Women's Health and Cancer Rights Act of 1998, Pub. L. 105-277,
§ 902(a), 112 Stat. 2681-436 (current version at 29 U.S.C. § 1185b (2006));
Mental Health Parity Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-204, § 702(a), 110 Stat. 2944 (cur-
rent version at 29 U.S.C. § 1185a (2006)).
66. See, e.g., Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 91 (1983) ("ERISA
does not mandate that employers provide any particular benefits, and does not
itself proscribe discrimination in the provision of employee benefits.");
McGann v. H & H Music Co., 946 F.2d 401, 408 (5th Cir. 1991) ("ERISA does
not broadly prevent an employer from 'discriminating' in the creation, altera-
tion or termination of employee benefits plans . . .
67. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2006).
68. Id. § 794(a). A qualified handicapped individual is defined as any
individual who has "a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits
one or more major life activities of such individual." 29 U.S.C. § 705(20) (B); 42
U.S.C. § 12102(2) (A).
69. Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. 88-352, § 601, 78 Stat.
252 (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2006)).
70. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1.
71. 469 U.S. 287 (1985).
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tively higher need for health care among the population." Rul-
ing against the plaintiffs unanimously, 3 the Supreme Court
determined that the Tennessee plan treated all populations
equally and where the content of health insurance coverage is
concerned, nothing in the Rehabilitation Act required that pub-
lic programs modify their terms to expressly take into account
the greater needs occasioned by disability. 4 The Court con-
cluded that Section 504 requires equality of opportunity, but not
fundamental alteration of benefits and services.
3. The Americans With Disabilities Act
Congress passed the ADA with the intention of providing a
"clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination
of discrimination against individuals with disabilities."76 While
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act prohibits discrimination on
the basis of disability only in the case of federally assisted pro-
grams, the ADA extends the duty not to discriminate to all pub-
licly funded programs,7 7  public and private places of
employment, and public accommodations, including health
care.7 ' Employee health benefits are considered an aspect of
employment, and thus a court would consider discrimination on
the basis of disability in the provision of health benefits
equivalent to discrimination on the basis of employment. Simi-
larly, the sale of health insurance is a private act that under the
terms of the ADA conceivably operates as a public accommoda-
tion, thereby raising the potential for the ADA to reach private
health insurance.
In addition to its general provisions, the ADA contains an
insurance "safe harbor" that provides that the law:
72. Id. at 290.
73. See id. at 303-06.
74. Compare id., with Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581 (1999)
(issue was not the discriminatory effect of an across the board limit, but the
state's failure to extend benefits covered under the state plan-home and com-
munity based service slots approved by the federal government-to individuals
with mental illness). In Choate, the issue was the non-discriminatory application
of a benefit design to persons with disabilities; in Olmstead, the issue was discrim-
inatory administration of the approved plan itself.
75. See Choate, 469 U.S. at 308.
76. 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (b) (1) (2006).
77. See id. § 12132.
78. Unlike other civil rights statutes, the ADA classifies health care as a
public accommodation. SeeJoel Teitelbaum & Sara Rosenbaum, Medical Care as
a Public Accommodation: Moving the Discussion to Race, 29 Am. J.L. & MED. 381,
381-82 (2003).
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shall not be construed to prohibit or restrict ... an insurer,
hospital or medical service company, health maintenance
organization, or any agent, or entity that administers bene-
fit plans, or similar organizations from underwriting risks,
classifying risks, or administering such risks that are based
on or not inconsistent with State law[,]79
provided that insurer actions are not intended as "a subterfuge to
evade the purposes""o of the ADA. According to an interpreta-
tion of these provisions by the U.S. Equal Employment Opportu-
nity Commission (EEOC), disability-based distinctions in
coverage that result in unequal benefits violate the ADA, unless
employers can prove that the coverage at issue is not meant as a
subterfuge."1 Effectively, the EEOC interprets the safe harbor
and subterfuge provisions as creating a safe harbor for insurance
discrimination based on disability, as long as actuarial data sup-
ports the differential classifications."
Early case law interpreting the ADA's public accommoda-
tions provision questioned whether the law reached the content
of insurance and thus provided new protections for individuals
with disabilities who routinely faced discrimination in a coverage
context. In Carparts Distribution Center, Inc. v. Automobile Wole-
saler's Association of New England, Inc.," an employee with an
AIDS-related illness received notice from his employer that going
forward, benefits for AIDS-related illnesses could not exceed
$25,000. The employee and his employer, Carparts Distribution
Center, Inc., sued the insurer, claiming that the AIDS-related
benefit cap was both a violation of the ADA's Title I prohibition
against discrimination on the basis of disability in employment,
as well as unlawful discrimination by a public accommodation.
Reversing and remanding the case following a decision for
the insurer, the First Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the notion
that the term "public accommodation" requires a physical struc-
ture. The court then discussed the meaning of a public accom-
modation in an insurance context at some length:
As a matter of bare language, one could spend some time
arguing about whether [Title III of the ADA, concerning
public accommodations] . . . is intended merely to provide
access to whatever product or service the subject entity may
79. 42 U.S.C. § 12201(c) (2006).
80. Id.
81. U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, EEOC COMPLIANCE
MANUAL, CI-IAPTER 3: EMPLOYEE BENEFITS (2000), available at http://www.eeoc.
gov/policy/docs/benefits.html.
82. See Crossley, supra note 27, at 93.
83. 37 F.3d 12 (1st Cir. 1994).
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offer, or is intended in addition to shape and control
which products and services may be offered .. .. [T] here
is nothing in that history that explicitly precludes an exten-
sion of the statute to the substance of what is being
offered .... The statute's treatment of insurance is a good
example of these ambiguities. On the one hand, the ADA
carves out a safe harbor of sorts for anyone who is "an
insurer, hospital, or medical service company, health main-
tenance organization, or any agent, or entity that adminis-
ters benefit plans, or similar organizations . . . ." One
might initially suppose that this is because Title III would
otherwise cover the substance of the insurance plans.
However, there is some indication in the legislative history
that the industry received this exemption not because its
policies would otherwise be substantively regulated under
Title III, but because "there is some uncertainty over the
possible interpretations of the language contained in titles
I, II and III as it applies to insurance . . . ." We think that at
this stage it is unwise to go beyond the possibility that the
plaintiff may be able to develop some kind of claim under
Title III even though this may be a less promising vehicle
in the present case than Title I [plaintiffs employment
claim].8
Other courts considering the question rejected the First Cir-
cuit notion regarding the potential reach of the ADA and ruled
that the public accommodations provision does not reach the
design of insurance products." The leading case in this string of
rejections to Carparts is Doe v. Mutual of Omaha Insurance Com-
84. Id. at 19-20 (emphasis in orginal); see also Henderson v. Bodine Alu-
minum, Inc., 70 F.3d 958, 960 (8th Cir. 1995) (insurer's denial of coverage for a
particular treatment in the context of breast cancer, but not other types of can-
cer, would "arguably" violate the ADA's public accommodations provision).
85. See Weyer v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 198 F.3d 1104, 1113
n.48 (9th Cir. 2000); McNeil v. Time Ins. Co., 205 F.3d 179, 186 (5th Cir. 2000);
Doe v. Mut. of Omaha Ins. Co., 179 F.3d 557, 559 (7th Cir. 1999); Rogers v.
Dep't of Health & Envtl. Control, 174 F.3d 431, 433 (4th Cir. 1999); Lenox v.
Healthwise of Ky., Ltd., 149 F.3d 453, 456 (6th Cir. 1998); Ford v. Schering-
Plough Corp., 145 F.3d 601, 614 (3d Cir. 1998); Parker v. Metro. Life Ins. Co.,
121 F.3d 1006, 1013 (6th Cir. 1997) (en banc); Vaughn v. Sullivan, 83 F.3d 907,
912 (7th Cir. 1996). At the same time, courts agree that the ADA's public
accommodations statute prohibits disability discrimination in the context of
gaining physical access to health care services. See Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S.
624, 646 (1998); Abernathy v. Valley Med. Ctr., No. C06-001 MJP, 2006 WL
1515600 (W.D. Wash. May 25, 2006); Majocha v. Turner, 166 F. Supp. 2d 316,
325 (W.D. Pa. 2001); Woolfolk v. Duncan, 872 F. Supp. 1381, 1390 (E.D. Pa.
1995).
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pany," in which the plaintiffs, individuals with AIDS, had pur-
chased health insurance from the defendant. Each of the health
plans purchased by the plaintiffs contained an AIDS and AIDS-
related condition lifetime cap ranging from $25,000 to $100,000,
compared to the standard lifetime cap of $1 million. The insur-
ance company explicitly stipulated as part of the record that it
had absolutely no actuarial basis for the cap."
In their suit, plaintiffs claimed that the ADA's public accom-
modations provision reached not just their right to buy an insur-
ance policy, but also the content of the insurance itself. Plaintiffs
premised their argument on the insurance "safe harbor" under
the EEOC's interpretation, arguing that the safe harbor was evi-
dence of clear intent on the part of Congress to reach the con-
tent of insurance in cases in which state or federal law precluded
a justifiable benefit limit and existed merely as a subterfuge to
evade ADA requirements." Because the safe harbor effectively
establishes a narrow exception for health insurance products that
are based in principles of actuarial soundness, plaintiffs argued
that the public accommodations statute could only be inter-
preted as reaching discriminatory content and design; otherwise
the safe harbor exception would have no legal or practical
function.
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals did not agree with the
plaintiffs' arguments, viewing plaintiffs' claims as essentially a
demand for the customization of a product to meet the particu-
larized needs of persons with disabilities. According to the court,
the ADA does not require this type of realignment of the design
and structure of goods and services and "does not require a seller
to alter his product in order to make it equally valuable to the
disabled and to the nondisabled, even if the product is insur-
ance."89 As a result, coverage limits embedded in plan design
and applicable to all purchasers would not violate the ADA's pub-
lic accommodations statute.
The court further asserted that it could not read the insur-
ance safe harbor provision as the plaintiffs proposed, citing the
obscurity of the provision and the standard that such a reading
would impose on courts, which would have to scrutinize virtually
every coverage limitation permitted under law either for its actu-
arial soundness or its potential to operate as a subterfuge. The
fact that Mutual of Omaha readily admitted that it had no basis
86. 179 F.3d at 557.
87. Id. at 558.
88. Id. at 562.
89. Id. at 563.
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(other than, by implication at least, outright prejudice against
persons with HIV/AIDS) for its coverage limitations made no dif-
ference. Nor did it matter to the court that the very purpose of
the ADA was to assure that covered entities would make reasona-
ble accommodations in the case of qualified persons with disabil-
ities and that by its very admission, the insurer had made none.
In sum, Section 504 and the ADA prohibit insurers from
refusing to sell products to, or barring enrollment of, individuals
with disabilities. However, neither law prohibits insurance con-
tent design that unfairly discriminateso against persons with disa-
bilities by unreasonably limiting the value of coverage in relation
to health care needs." Coverage limitations (or exclusions)
applied uniformly to all participants in the insurance product are
acceptable under Section 504 and the ADA, regardless of
whether those limitations arbitrarily single out individuals and
conditions for differential treatment.
4. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act
The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act
(HIPAA)" represented an important step by federal lawmakers
to address the problem of insurer discrimination against persons
with disabilities. Indeed, HIPAA protections apply to "[h]ealth
status,"" rather than "disabilities," meaning the law's reach is
potentially broader than that found in the ADA, the protections
90. Health insurance has long recognized the concept of fair discrimina-
tion, that is, the adjustment of price in relation to health need. This concept
might justify higher premiums; it does not justify coverage limits that unreason-
ably constrain the level of benefits that are available in the face of need. See
RAND E. ROSENBLATr, SYLVIA A. LAW & SARA ROSENBAUM, LAW AND THE AMERi-
cAN HEALTH CARE SYSTEM 169 (Supp. 2001).
91. The court might have concluded that the ADA prohibited unreasona-
ble limits but not adjustments in pricing (i.e., a higher premium rate) to accom-
modate higher health risk policyholders in the individual market. The Health
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act did not address rating in the indi-
vidual or group markets. The PPACA prohibits both annual and lifetime caps
on covered benefits, see PPACA, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1001, 124 Stat. 119,
130-38 (2010) (amending the Public Health Service Act), and requires the use
of modified community rating for health insurance products sold in both the
individual and group markets, permitting variations based only on age, family
status, and use of tobacco. See id. § 1201, 124 Stat. at 154-61 (same). This fact
would seem to underscore the fundamental purpose of health insurance,
namely, to protect against health risks among the covered population without
the use of unreasonable limitations designed to reduce the value of coverage in
ways that unfairly and unreasonably discriminate against the sick.
92. Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996) (codified as amended in
various sections of 26 U.S.C., 29 U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C.).
93. 29 U.S.C. §1182(a)(1)(A) (2006); 42 U.S.C. § 3 00gg-1(a)(1)(A)
(2006).
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of which are contingent on being a qualified individual with a
disability." However, as with both Section 504 and the ADA,
HIPPA's application extends only to the threshold question of
eligibility for coverage, not to the post-eligibility questions of cov-
erage content or plan administration.
The central aim of HIPAA was to eliminate considerations of
individual health status from decisions concerning the eligibility
and group-specific coverage costs in the group health insurance
market. 5 The law made virtually no changes in the inherently
discriminatory nature of individual coverage products, where
medical underwriting has been the historic norm in determining
both eligibility and coverage rates charged to specific policyhold-
ers." HIPAA specifically prohibited insurers and employer-spon-
sored group health plans from considering health status, mental
or physical health conditions, claims experience, the prior
receipt of care, medical history, genetic information, evidence of
insurability, and disability in making eligibility and premium
decisions in the group market." Furthermore, its prohibitions
attached to the initial and renewal enrollment periods, waiting
periods, late and special enrollment rules, eligibility for benefit
packages, benefits (both cost sharing and benefit restrictions),
continued eligibility, and coverage termination." Despite the
reforms HIPAA brought about, the law generally still did not
reach insurance coverage design or plan administration tech-
niques that reduced the value of coverage for certain individuals.
Indeed, the reforms in eligibility and pricing embodied in
HIPAA conceivably may have contributed to tighter coverage lim-
its; in a voluntary market, as eligibility and pricing barriers are
scaled back, a natural retaliatory strategy would be to lessen the
value of the product, either for the group as a whole or for
selected members and conditions within the group.
94. We note, however, that HIPAA protections only apply to individuals
with prior insurance coverage, so individuals without coverage (or with a lapse
of coverage of more than six months) can still be denied access to the insurance
in the first instance.
95. Greta E. Cowart, HIPAA Nondiscrimination and Portability Update, in
33RD ANNUAL ALI-ABA ADVANCED COURSE REPRESENTING THE PROFESSIONAL AND
CLOSELY HELD BUSINESS 1, 15-16 (2004).
96. KAREN POLLITZ, RICHARD SORIAN & KATHY THOMAS, THE HENRYJ. KAI-
SER FAMILY FOUND., How ACCESSIBLE IS INDIVIDUAL HEALTH INSURANCE FOR CON-
SUMERS IN LESS-THAN-PERFECT HEALTH? 20-26 (2001), http://www.kff.org/
insurance/upload/How-Accessible-is-Individual-Health-Insurance-for-Consum
er-in-Less-Than-Perfect-Health-Report.pdf.
97. See 29 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (2006); 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-1(a) (2006).
98. 29 C.F.R. § 2590.702(b) (1) (ii) (2004); 45 C.F.R. § 146.121(b) (1) (ii)
(2010).
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5. Mental Health Parity Laws
The Mental Health Parity Act of 1996,99 revised and
expanded by the Paul Wellstone and Pete Domenici Mental
Health Parity and Addiction Equity Act of 2008,00 represents the
most significant law enacted prior to the PPACA that directly
addresses discrimination in the content and administration of
state-regulated health insurance and employer-sponsored health
benefit plans. While the law is important for this reason, it
reaches only mental illness and addiction disorder conditions to
the extent that a plan in fact covers them.
The original 1996 law addressed parity only as the concept
related to both annual and lifetime financial limits on coverage,
prohibiting such limits in the context of mental illness if not
applied to other illnesses and conditions. The 2008 amendments
significantly extended the concept of parity to reach beyond the
tip of the iceberg and delve down into the types of limitations,
exclusions, and plan administration techniques that can dimin-
ish the value and scope of coverage for particular conditions.
Interim final regulations implementing parity, promulgated in
2009,'01 adopted an aggressive interpretation of the amend-
ments, barring the use of both "qualitative" and "quantitative"
limitations on coverage, including both differentials in the
amount of coverage as well as differential approaches to consid-
ering the medical necessity of coverage. For example, the regula-
tions clarified that the amendments barred the use of fixed
clinical treatment guidelines that limit coverage for mental ill-
nesses and addiction disorders to certain covered treatments irre-
spective of medical evidence, unless a similar approach was taken
to the treatment of physical conditions.102 The interim final rule
also barred the use of medical necessity terms and definitions
that were more restrictive in the case of mental illness and addic-
tion disorders.os
A breakthrough in federal regulation of health plan con-
tent, and applicable to both the fully insured and self-insured
group markets, the 2008 parity amendments nonetheless con-
99. Pub. L. No. 104-204, § 701-03, 110 Stat. 2944, 2944-50 (codified as
amended at various sections of 29 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C).
100. Pub. L. 110-343, §§ 511-12, 122 Stat. 3765, 3881-93 (2008) (codi-
fied as amended at 26 U.S.C. § 9812, 29 U.S.C. § 1185a, and 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-
5).
101. Interim Final Rules Under the Paul Wellstone and Pete Domenici
Mental Health Parity and Addiction Equity Act of 2008, 75 Fed. Reg. 5410 (Feb.
2, 2010) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 54; 29 C.F.R. pt. 2590; 45 C.F.R pt. 146).
102. 29 C.F.R. § 2590.712(b) (4) (2010).
103. 45 C.F.R. § 146.136 (b) (4) (2010).
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strain themselves to mental illness and addiction disorders and
then, of course, only if a plan covers the conditions at all. Noth-
ing in the parity statute compelled such coverage; furthermore,
the parity amendments did not affect the individual insurance
market.
III. THE PPACA's ESSENTIAL BENEFITS STATUTE
A. Overview of the Affordable Care Act
To understand the provisions of the essential benefits stat-
ute, it is helpful to review the broad outlines of the PPACA, as
they relate to coverage and the content of coverage. Drawing on
a range of ideas, including Republican proposals to create a sub-
sidized competitive health insurance market, the PPACA at its
core is a series of reforms aimed at shoring up the multi-payer
approach to coverage in the U.S. while making coverage availa-
ble and affordable to most Americans. The quid pro quo for this
effort to restructure health insurance to make it accessible and
more comprehensive is what is commonly referred to as the
PPACA's "insurance mandate," which in reality is the imposition
of a tax penalty on individuals who are considered to have access
to affordable coverage as defined under the Act"4 but who do
not obtain it.105
The PPACA utilizes an expanded Medicaid program to
cover the poorest Americans. 1o Citizens and persons legally pre-
sent in the U.S.1 o' and considered to be without access to afford-
104. PPACA, Pub. L. No. 111-148 § 1501, 124 Stat. 119, 242-52 (2010).
105. See Thomas More Law Center v. Obama, 720 F. Supp. 2d 882 (E.D.
Mich. 2010), for defendants' response to plaintiffs' motion for preliminary
injunction and brief in support.
106. See When 133 Equals 138: FPL Calculations in the Affordable Care Act,
STATE HEALTH ACCEss DATA AssISTANCE CTR. (Jan. 13, 2011), http://
www.shadac.org/blog/when-133-equals-138-fpl-calculations-in-affordable-care-
act. PPACA § 2001 requires states to cover individuals not otherwise eligible for
Medicaid with incomes up to 133% of the Federal Poverty Level. Id. However,
under § 2002(I), beginning January 1, 2014, states will be required to use a new
method for determining income eligibility. The new method, termed "modi-
fied adjusted gross income," is determined by calculating the "dollar equivalent
of the difference between the upper income limit on eligibility for such an indi-
vidual (expressed as a percentage of the poverty line) and such upper income
limit increased by five percentage points; and . . . utilize as the applicable
income of such individual in determining income eligibility . . . ." PPACA
§ 2002 (a) (14) (1) (i), 124 Stat. at 279-82. According to the State Health Access
Data Assistance Center, the language will result in an "income disregard,"
resulting in states being required to cover individuals with incomes up to 138%
of FPL. When 133 Equals 138, supra note 106.
107. See PPACA § 1312(f) (3), 124 Stat. at 184.
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able employer-sponsored coverage'os would have access to an
organized individual insurance market through state entities
known as health insurance exchanges. 10 9 Individuals deemed
qualified to purchase coverage through exchanges would,
depending on family income, be entitled to advance premium
tax credits whose purpose is to bring the cost of coverage within
the range considered affordable under the Act.110 Small employ-
ersi1 would also be able to purchase coverage through state
exchanges and be entitled to tax subsidies. Large employers 12
offering no coverage, or unaffordable coverage, would pay a fee
toward the exchange subsidy system." Although Congress and
the Obama Administration envision that all states will operate
health insurance exchanges, 1 1 4 the PPACA also empowers the
Secretary of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services
(HHS) to establish and operate an exchange in states that elect
not to operate their own exchanges. 1 '
Beyond the threshold restructuring of the insurance market
to make it accessible, the PPACA also reaches into the content
and fairness of health insurance coverage and employee health
benefits in a number of respects. With certain limited excep-
tions, the reforms will take effect in January 2014 when the obli-
gation to purchase affordable coverage commences."'
108. Id. § 1401 (a), 124 Stat. at 213-19.
109. Id. § 1311(b), 124 Stat. at 173-74.
110. Id. § 1312(f)(2)(B), 124 Stat. at 184. Individuals not eligible for
Medicaid and those without affordable employer-sponsored coverage are eligi-
ble for income-related premium subsidies. The subsidies are fully phased-out
for individuals with incomes above 400% of the federal poverty level. Id.
§ 1401 (a), 124 Stat. at 213-19.
111. Small employers eligible to purchase the exchange are defined as
those with 100 or fewer employees. Beginning January 1, 2016, states have the
option of lowering the threshold for employers that may purchase through an
exchange from those with fifty or fewer employees. Id. § 1304(b) (3), 124 Stat.
at 172. In addition, beginning in 2017, states may permit large employers to
purchase coverage through an exchange. Id. § 1312(f) (2) (B) (i), 124 Stat. at
184.
112. Id. § 1301(b) (1), 124 Stat. at 163.
113. Id. § 1513, 124 Stat. at 253-56.
114. See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., HHS
Announces New Resources to Help States Implement Affordable Care Act (Jan.
20, 2011), available at http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2011pres/01/201101
20b.html. On January 20, 2011, Secretary Sebelius announced a second round
of planning grants made available to states to assist in the establishment of state-
level exchanges. According to the Secretary, "States are moving forward, imple-
menting the Affordable Care Act and making reform a reality." Id.
115. PPACA § 1321(c), 124 Stat. at 186-87.
116. Id. § 1253, 124 Stat. at 162. To achieve that balance in insurance
market reforms, the PPACA seeks to minimize disruption in existing insurance
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The insurance reform provisions of the PPACA build on
HIPAA, extending its reach and applying the reforms to the indi-
vidual market. The law bars all insurers and group health plans
from denying coverage to all individuals based on health status,
thereby extending the reach of HIPAA's non-discrimination pro-
visions, which previously had applied only to those with prior
group coverage."' The PPACA bars rescissions (post-enrollment
insurance cancellations) in the absence of evidence of fraud or
misrepresentation on the part of the insured,"' while guarantee-
ing both issuance of policies and their renewal."' The PPACA
also requires coverage of certain preventive services without cost-
sharing2 o and bars annual and lifetime limits."' In the case of
insurance products, it requires the use of modified community
rating, with rating differentials limited to age, family status, and
tobacco use. The PPACA dictates that medical loss ratios, or the
proportion of premium dollars that an insurer spends on health
care services and certain recognized plan administration costs
relative to health insurance premiums paid by subscribers, be
established in order to assure minimum standards for medical
expenditures in both the individual and group insurance
markets. 122
All of these changes go to the issue of access to insurance for
persons with health conditions that previously would have been
barred coverage entirely or would have obtained coverage only at
an unaffordable cost. The reforms are possible because of the
markets by incorporating a transition period and by providing "grandfather"
status for plans in existence prior to the March 23, 2010, date of enactment.
While some insurance market reforms became effective in plan years beginning
after October 1, 2010, it is not until plan years beginning on or afterJanuary 1,
2014, that plans will be required to comply with the most sweeping federal mini-
mum insurance market standards. "Grandfathered" plans are not required to
meet many of the new standards unless the plan changes significantly, trigger-
ing a loss of grandfather status. Interim Final Rules for Group Health Plans
and Health Insurance Coverage Relating to Status as a Grandfathered Health
Plan under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 75 Fed. Reg. 34,598
Uune 17, 2010). See also Amendment to the Interim Final Rules for Group
Health Plans and Health Insurance Coverage Relating to Status as a
Grandfathered Health Plan Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care
Act, 75 Fed. Reg. 70,114 (Nov. 17, 2010).
117. PPACA §§ 1201-1304. 124 Stat. at 154-72.
118. Id. § 1001, 124 Stat. at 130-38 (amending Public Health Service Act,
42 U.S.C. § 2712 (2006)).
119. Id. § 2703, 124 Stat. at 319-23.
120. Id. § 1001, 124 Stat. at 131-32.
121. Id., 124 Stat. at 131.
122. Id., 124 Stat. at 136-37. Medical loss ratio requirements do not
apply to self-funded plans regulated under ERISA.
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assumption that the tax penalty applicable to individuals who do
not buy affordable coverage will create the type of health insur-
ance risk pool essential to curbing discrimination against the
sick.
The PPACA also deals directly with the question of the scope
and depth of coverage by setting federal standards for all prod-
ucts sold in the individual and small group markets, whether as
qualified health plans certified to be sold in health insurance
exchanges, and thus eligible to receive advance premium tax
credits, or in states' remaining non-exchange individual and
group health markets. Put another way, the PPACA permits
states to continue operating non-exchange individual and group
health insurance markets. At the same time, the law sets mini-
mum content standards for products sold to individuals and
small groups, defined for purposes of the content standard as
100 full-time employees or fewer,1 23 regardless of whether the
point of sale is an exchange or a state's remaining non-exchange
market. These minimum content requirements are set forth
under the law's "essential health benefits" statute.124
The history of enactment of the PPACA is the stuff of leg-
end. A measure rammed through by a determined majority over
the aggressive objections of a minority,125 the PPACA that
became law is, word for word, the measure passed in the Senate
on December 24, 2009,121 with the exception of a handful of
amendments that followed initial passage.1 2 1 In March 2010, to
123. Id. § 1304, 124 Stat. at 171-72.
124. Id. § 1302, 124 Stat. at 163-68.
125. This was not the first time such a thing happened, of course; one
need look no further than the Medicare Prescription Drug Improvement and
Modernization Act of 2003 to find a similar story. See Sara Rosenbaum, Realign-
ing the Social Order. The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act and the U.S. Health
Insurance System, 7 SuFFoLK J. HEALTH & BIOMEDIcAL L. (forthcoming Winter
2011).
126. H.R. 3590, 111th Cong. (2009).
127. See, e.g., Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub.
L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029 (2010). This Act changed the structure of the
premium and cost-sharing subsidies to make them more generous for the low-
est-income individuals; decreased the penalty for failure to purchase health
insurance coverage; decreased the employer penalty for failing to provide
health insurance coverage; lowered and delayed implementation of a tax on
"high-cost" insurance plans; increased federal payments to states under Medi-
caid to help offset the cost of expansions; accelerated the rate at which the
Medicare Part D "donut hole" is closed in order to lower seniors' out-of-pocket
expenses for prescription drugs; extended certain insurance market reforms
including prohibitions on rescissions and lifetime caps on coverage to all insur-
ance plans, including grandfathered plans; and increased the general excise tax
on health insurance plans to offset the costs of changes. Finally, the law elimi-
nated certain special provisions that benefited Nebraska and other states.
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stave off defeat of passage, the House of Representatives
accepted the Senate bill in its entirety. 12' Doing so avoided hav-
ing to complete what had by then become a futile conference
agreement with the Senate, whose composition by January 2010
had fallen below filibuster-proof levels with the election of
Republican Senator Scott Brown of Massachusetts.
For a law whose provisions are highly complex and whose
enactment was undoubtedly one of the hardest fought in U.S.
history, the PPACA is remarkably short on legislative history.
The essential benefits statute originated in a measure reported
by the Senate Health, Education, Labor, & Pensions (HELP)
Committee; The Senate Majority Leader subsequently joined the
measure12 9 with a separate measure from the Senate Finance
Committee, the second of the two principal Senate health poli-
cymaking committees.1 3 0 As passed on the Senate floor (with no
floor discussion of the provision) and as finally enacted into law,
the essential benefits statute retains a good portion of the com-
mittee provisions that preceded it while nonetheless modifying
those provisions in key ways.
In defining "essential health benefits," the statute sets forth
a series of broad benefit classes131 that the Secretary of HHS
must include in the definition. The Secretary can define the
scope of essential health benefits more broadly but must include
"at least" the following groups of benefits as well as the "items
and services"'1 2 falling within these benefit classes: "ambulatory
patient services; emergency services; hospitalization; maternity
and newborn care; mental health and substance use disorder ser-
vices, including behavioral health treatment; prescription drugs;
rehabilitative and habilitative services and devices; laboratory ser-
vices; preventive and wellness services and chronic disease man-
agement; and pediatric services, including oral and vision
care." 33 The statute leaves the terms undefined and gives the
Secretary discretion to define them. At least one prominent
health insurance industry expert has noted that the list includes
at least one benefit class not found in the large group market,
which tends to provide benefits that are more generous than
those found in the individual and small group markets. 3 1
128. S. 1796, 111th Cong. (2009).
129. H.R. 3590, 111th Cong. (2009).
130. America's Healthy Future Act of 2009, S. REP. No. 111-89 (2009).
131. PPACA, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1302, 124 Stat. 119, 163-68 (2010).
132. Id.
133. Id. § 1302(b) (1), 124 Stat. at 163-64.
134. Jeffrey Kang, Chief Med. Officer, CIGNA Corp., Statement to the
Committee on Determination of Essential Health Benefits at the Institute of
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Although the HHS Secretary thus has broad discretion to
define the scope of essential benefits, the PPACA places impor-
tant limits on the Secretary's authority. The first is an admoni-
tion tying the scope of coverage to that found in "typical"
employer-sponsored plans"' although, as noted, industry experts
report that in scope the essential health benefit classes reach
beyond typical plans. In achieving this result, the Secretary must
consult with the Secretary of the U.S. Department of Labor
(DOL), who will conduct a congressionally mandated survey of
employer plans designed to inform that decision.13 1
Most importantly for purposes of this Article, the PPACA
places further limits on her discretion by specifying a series of
"elements for consideration" that the Secretary must address in
defining essential benefits.' First, the Secretary must ensure
that the benefits "reflect an appropriate balance," among the
essential health benefit classes.13 8 Second, the Secretary may not
"make coverage decisions, determine reimbursement rates, establish incen-
tive programs, or design benefits in ways that discriminate against indi-
viduals because of their age, disability or expected length of life."13 9
Third, the Secretary must "take into account the health care
needs of diverse segments of the population including women,
children, persons with disabilities, and other groups.""o Fourth,
the Secretary must ensure that health benefits are not subject to
denial on the basis of individuals' "age or expected length of life
or of the individuals' present or predicted disability, degree of
medical dependency, or quality of life.""'
Finally, the PPACA includes language limiting the Secre-
tary's discretion with respect to utilization management, which
the statute does not define. Specifically, the law states that
[nlotwithstanding any other provision of [this] . .. Act,
nothing in such Act . .. shall be construed to prohibit (or
authorize the Secretary of Health and Human Services to
promulgate regulations that prohibit) a group health plan
or health insurance issuer from carrying out utilization
Medicine (Jan. 13, 2011), available at http://www.iom.edu/-/media/Files/
Activity%20Files/HealthServices/EssentialHealthBenefits/2011-JAN-1 2/Kang-
Statement.pdf. Dr. Kang noted in his testimony that habilitation services are
rarely covered as a benefit in the group market.
135. PPACA § 1302(b) (2) (A), 124 Stat. at 164.
136. Id.
137. Id. § 1302(b) (4), 124 Stat. at 164-65.
138. Id. § 1302(b) (4) (A), 124 Stat. at 164.
139. Id. § 1302(b) (4) (B), 124 Stat. at 164 (emphasis added).
140. Id. § 1302(b) (4) (C), 124 Stat. at 164.
141. Id. § 1302(b) (4) (D), 124 Stat. at 164.
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management techniques that are commonly used as of the
date of enactment of this Act.'4 2
B. Application of the Essential Benefits Statute to Persons
with Disabilities
It is important to note that under the terms of the essential
health benefits statute, the actual extent of coverage will vary
depending on the level of premium paid (the statute envisions
four levels of premium/cost sharing combinations)." Further-
more, the statute permits exceptions to essential benefit require-
ments in the case of products sold to very young adults." At the
same time, the essential benefit statute applies to all products
and all coverage levels in the affected markets, regardless of
whether the products are available through state exchanges.
As noted, the essential benefit statute offers little in the way
of legislative history. During testimony in January 2011 before
the Institute of Medicine (IOM), which HHS charged with assist-
ing in defining the term "essential health benefits,"" Senate
committee staff noted that legislative history was lacking but were
able to provide some insight into congressional intent underlying
the statute."' Staff offered differing views of the breadth of cov-
erage the provision intended and the extent to which the Secre-
tary should delegate decisions to health insurance plans, as
opposed to including them in regulation or other agency gui-
dance. 147 One area of agreement among the witnesses, however,
was that Congress intentionally drafted the law broadly in order
to vest the Secretary with considerable discretion in order to
avoid the political controversy associated with clearly defining
benefits in the statute.148
142. Id. § 1562(d) (1), 124 Stat. at 269.
143. Id. §§ 1302(a) (3), 1563, 124 Stat. at 163, 270-71.
144. Id. § 1302(e), 124 Stat. at 168. Congress included a lower-cost insur-
ance policy that covers essential benefits that would be made available to indi-
viduals under the age of thirty and those that are certified as exempt from the
individual requirement because coverage is unaffordable. See America's
Healthy Future Act of 2009, S. REP. No. 111-89, at 33 (2009).
145. For information about the joint HHS-IOM effort, see Project: Defining
and Revising an Essential Health Benefits Package for Qualified Health Plans, THE
NAT'L AcADs., http://www8.nationalacademies.org/cp/projectview.aspx?key=
49299 (last visited June 13, 2011).
146. See Audio tape: Essential Health Benefits Workshop, held by the
Institute of Medicine (Jan. 13, 2011), available at http://www.nap.edu/webcast/
webcast detail.phpwebcast-id=430.
147. Id.
148. Id.
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At the same time, the statute offers the Secretary virtually no
guidance on how to "take into consideration" matters such as
plan design, coverage limits, and plan administration matters in
determining the permissible level of discretion on the part of
insurers whose products are subject to the statute. The statute
does not define terms such as "discriminate" and "disability."14 9
Nor does the law define the concept of a "utilization manage-
ment" technique, "typical" employee coverage, "on the basis of,"
or other key terms that appear in the statute and that the Secre-
tary must consider when setting the parameters of the essential
health benefit package.
Given the scope of the statute in the context of disability
discrimination, existing health insurance practices, and the over-
all structure and design of the PPACA, the question becomes
how might the Secretary approach the "considerations" that she
must weigh in promulgating standards. Perhaps the starting
point is the paradoxical statutory juxtaposition of the concept of
a "typical" employer plan and the considerations the statute
requires the Secretary to take into account in defining essential
health benefits. On the one hand, "typical" 5 o plans are the legal
opening salvo. But the Secretary should weigh the results of the
DOL survey against the requirement that she "not make coverage
decisions, determine reimbursement rates, establish incentive
programs, or design benefits in ways that discriminate against
individuals because of their . . . disability . . . ."'" By its terms,
therefore, the law appears to envision that the Secretary will
begin with a typical plan-typical in the entire employer market?
the small group market?-and will then adjust coverage terms in
a manner that reflects the command of the statute.
The second question relates to the meaning of terms. Will
the Secretary adopt the ADA definition of "disability"?15 2 Moreo-
ver, will the prohibition against discrimination apply to all per-
149. According to former Senate Finance Committee staff, the language
was included in the Senate version of the PPACA during the merger of provi-
sions from the Senate Finance and Health, Education, Labor & Pensions Com-
mittees. This language was offered as amendment number 285 in the Senate
HELP Committee markup by Senator Mike Enzi (R-Wyo.) and was accepted by
the majority with no debate. The amendment was praised as an anti-rationing
amendment in a press release issued by the National Right to Life Committee.
See The HELP Bill, NAT'L RIGHT To LiE COMM., http://www.nrlc.org/Health-
CareRationing/HELPbill.html (last visited June 13, 2011).
150. PPACA, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1302(b)(2)(A), 124 Stat. 119, 164
(2010).
151. Id. § 1302(b)(4)(B), 124 Stat. at 164.
152. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1) (2006). The ADA defines the term "disability"
as "a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major
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sons with disabilities or only those who are considered "qualified
persons" with disabilities, which in the context of the ADA pre-
sumably could encompass qualified persons protected under
Titles I (employer coverage), II (public programs),' and 111.154
The PPACA's civil rights statute is oddly silent on the applicabil-
ity of the ADA, even as it mentions Section 504. Nothing in the
PPACA suggests that the law is exempt from previous rulings
regarding the reach of the ADA into employee health benefits
and insurance as a form of public accommodation.15 5
The key question focuses on the meaning of "discriminate."
As noted, the "typical" employer product discriminates against
persons with disabilities in the sense that products typically use
benefit design, payment, and plan administration techniques
that reduce the value of the product for specific conditions or
populations. For example, as noted, insurers may cap coverage
for HIV/AIDS. Insurers may also define specific service classes to
exclude their reach in the case of children with developmental
disabilities (for whom covered medical benefits are developmen-
tal rather than restorative), and adults with conditions such as
multiple sclerosis or other disabling conditions from which they
will never recover. Medical necessity definitions may hinge on a
finding of restoration or improvement. Embedded treatment
guidelines may be appropriate for individuals with no underlying
disability while unfairly restrictive in cases in which a condition is
life activities of such individual; a record of such an impairment; or being
regarded as having such an impairment." Id.
153. PPACA § 1311, 124 Stat. at 173-81. A related question is whether
coverage purchased through an exchange is considered a public program. One
could argue that it is, since exchanges operate under the authority of public
law, even though their products are private health insurance products. In this
regard, the civil rights provision of the Act appears to classify tax subsidies as
federal financial assistance for purposes of applying Section 504 of the Rehabili-
tation Act. See id. § 1557, 124 Stat. at 260. The statute is inconclusive as to
whether exchanges themselves are considered a public program for purposes of
the ADA, although in their establishment, exchanges receive federal grants and
are operated as programs with public accountability under state and federal
law.
154. As noted above, the insurance cases under the ADA classify insur-
ance as a public accommodation, at least insofar as the sale of insurance prod-
ucts is concerned.
155. In cases in which two federal statues are silent as to their relation-
ship, a court must read them with an eye toward preserving each. Only if stat-
ues are irreconcilably conflicting, or if the later law covers the whole subject of
the first and is clearly intended to be a substitute, will courts apply the rule that
the later of the two prevails. See YULE KIM, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION: GENERAL PRINCIPLES AND RECENT TRENDS 26-27 (2008) http://
www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/97-589.pdf (citing Watt v. Alaska, 451 U.S. 439, 453
(1981); Posadas v. Nat'l City Bank, 296 U.S. 497, 503 (1936)).
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compounded by a disability that necessitates more intensive or
additional treatment to make an intervention effective. For
example, a woman with breast cancer who also has an underlying
heart condition may require greater or different treatments from
the types of cancer treatments that otherwise applicable practice
guidelines would normally cover.
Given other provisions of the PPACA, such as the elimina-
tion of annual and lifetime caps, the prohibition against discrimi-
nation based on condition or health status, and the use of
modified community rating, it is arguable that the prohibition
against discrimination based on disability would require insurers
to employ only "soft" coverage limits that permit adjustments
based on the presence of a disability. That is, the statutory con-
sideration that the Secretary must give to disability discrimina-
tion arguably might bar the use of hard stops on covered
treatments that by their very nature are arbitrary and unrelated
to the presence of a disability. Such hard stops might find
expression in fixed coverage limits, the use of fixed treatment
guidelines, or the use of benefit and coverage definitions that
exclude based on the presence of a disability that will endure
even if a treatment may avert further decline, improve function,
or enable an individual to participate in activities of daily living.
This is not to say that insurers would have to cover benefit classes
not encompassed in the definition of an essential health benefit.
For example, the definition does not cover personal care ser-
vices, a major service for persons with disabilities (although, con-
ceivably, personal care might be classified as a form of
habilitation or a rehabilitation treatment). In effect, in order to
avert discrimination on the basis of disability, the regulations
arguably would require insurers to provide an exceptions process
under which an individual with a disability could demonstrate
the need for a disability-based adjustment to a normative treat-
ment limit in order to avert discrimination. Such a process pre-
sumably would be fact-based and subject to the appeals
protections available to all claims involving all covered persons
under the PPACA.15 '
Furthermore, the requirement that the "typical" plan be
adjusted to bar discrimination would seem to prohibit the use of
coverage limits tied to "restoration" or "recovery." That is to say
that the essential benefits statute, by its very terms, precludes
insurers' use of limiting terms that exclude persons with disabili-
ties from coverage by effectively requiring that an individual
156. PPACA § 1001, 124 Stat. at 130-38 (amending Public Health Service
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2719 (2006)).
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somehow has been "normal" to begin with, so that treatments are
in effect a restoration of "normalcy." Speech therapy or surgery
on a cleft palate for a child whose disability precludes speech is
not restorative; it is instead a medical intervention that enables
speech initially. Similarly, the purpose of physical therapy for an
adult with multiple sclerosis is not to restore normal functioning
or to enable recovery; its purpose instead is to avert further
decline and maintain functioning. Nothing about these pur-
poses makes the intervention any less medical; the nature of the
intervention turns on the individual furnishing the service, such
as a licensed or certified health professional, and whether health
professionals classify the treatment as medical when such a pro-
fessional performs it.
Beyond benefit design, the statute requires that the Secre-
tary consider the discriminatory potential of coverage determina-
tions. Two types of coverage determinations (the term is not
defined) are potentially on the table: whether a particular treat-
ment or procedure will merit coverage for any plan member
(e.g., whether to place a particular treatment within the scope of
coverage); and whether an individual receives coverage for a par-
ticular service based on the facts of a case. Nothing in the law
suggests that Congress intended to exclude either type of cover-
age determination. Regarding the first type of determinations,
or "macro" decisions, the determination would appear to require
that disability specifically considered. For example, cosmetic ser-
vices or educational services would presumably be excluded for
all persons. But what is cosmetic for an individual without a disa-
bility (i.e., someone who wants a prettier nose), might not be cos-
metic in the case of an individual whose dento-facial deformity
amounts to a disability. As with benefit design limits that attempt
to utilize hard stops, the same might be said about macro exclu-
sions; that is, an exclusion would be permissible unless an excep-
tion were necessary to adjust the coverage determination to
account for the presence of a disability. Similarly, an educational
exclusion could assure that insurance does not treat the educa-
tional services of licensed teachers as medical care. But where
the intervention is cognitive development furnished by a thera-
pist as a habilitation service to a child with a disability and pursu-
ant to an individualized education plan under the Individuals
with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 157 the service arguably
would cease to be educational, since it is a covered benefit fur-
nished by a licensed health professional, although potentially in
an educational setting (i.e., in an elementary school during
157. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d) (2006).
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school hours). Indeed, to allow an educational setting to trump
habilitation coverage runs the risk of excluding many of the most
important types of health care interventions furnished to chil-
dren with physical and mental disabilities resulting in develop-
mental delays, the effects of which health interventions can
ameliorate. To be sure, insurers would retain the ability to place
training, network membership, and other reasonable limitations
on who may provide the service; but a total exclusion of a service
simply through the use of an "education" label would appear to
be precisely the type of exclusion that historically has reduced
the value of coverage for persons with disabilities in an arbitrary
fashion.
Similarly, the Secretary would need to consider incentive
plans. A possible approach would be to bar the use of plans that
incentivize only the reduction of resource use and that fail to
adjust for the underlying health status of a provider's patients.
Thus, network exclusion or penalties (in the form of not being
classified as a "preferred" provider with lower cost-sharing) that
do not adjust for the presence of disability among a provider's
population arguably would constitute discrimination against per-
sons with disabilities, because the presence of patients with disa-
bilities simply is not taken into account when designing provider
compensation arrangements.
IV. CONCLUSION
In light of what preceded it, the essential health benefits
statute represents a leap into the content of health insurance
that, in its own way, is nearly as breathtaking as the PPACA's leap
into insurance accessibility itself. Given the fundamental pur-
pose of the PPACA-to halt discrimination by health insurers
against the sick while creating access for most Americans-it
makes sense to read the essential benefits statute broadly. The
considerations required of the Secretary could not be clearer:
even if employer benefit plans today typically discriminate
against the sick, this type of discrimination should cease given
the risk-spreading design of the statute and its purpose of assur-
ing reasonable coverage for covered persons. Insurance is not
simply about having something that the market calls coverage,
no matter how inadequate. Insurance is about having reasonable
financial protection against the cost of necessary health care. For
persons with disabilities, the cost of necessary health care fre-
quently will be higher as a result of the disability. The essential
benefits provisions of the PPACA, which reach the very content
of coverage, represent a breakthrough in the concept of what it
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means to be insured that extend beyond the limits of prior laws,
including civil rights laws specifically intended to protect persons
with disabilities.
The policy leap embodied in the PPACA makes sense on two
grounds. First, why would Congress take the enormous step of
assuring risk pooling and fair treatment of all eligible persons
while continuing to sanction a level of health benefits that
unfairly discriminates against persons with disabilities, by failing
to level the playing field on what it means to have coverage? As
the dissent noted in Doe v. Mutual of Omaha,' understanding a
bar on discrimination as an effort to customize insurance prod-
ucts misses the point: the issue is not creating an unfair disadvan-
tage for persons with disabilities by reducing the value of their
coverage below reasonable levels.
Second, it makes sense to understand health insurance
reform as advancing several social purposes. Certainly reform
advances the goal of assuring a reasonable level of health care
financing for nearly all Americans. But American society has
other great aims, one of which, embodied in the Americans With
Disabilities Act, is the fullest reasonable community integration
of persons with disabilities. Fortunately, American society is far
beyond the time when only people without disabilities had jobs,
married, raised families and children, and actively participated in
society. It makes eminent sense that if the nation went through
the gut-wrenching experience of a great leap forward in national
health reform, policymakers also should use the opportunity to
assure that to the greatest degree reasonably possible, persons
with disabilities enjoy the full benefit of reform.
One of the great unknowns is how the essential benefits stat-
ute will affect the large group markets that are exempt from its
reach. Nothing in the statute requires larger employer group
plans, whether fully insured or self-insured, to stop discriminat-
ing in insurance content against the sick. But with full and
robust implementation of the essential benefits statute, one can
at least hope that the nation will come to understand the enor-
mous value of an approach to coverage that moves away from
penalizing persons with disabilities, that learns to adjust in ways
that level the playing field, and that recognizes the importance of
reasonable investments in all people. Perhaps in time, as the risk
pool grows and stabilizes, non-discriminatory conduct will
become the new normal for the insurance industry as a whole.
158. Doe v. Mut. of Omaha Ins. Co., 179 F.3d 557, 565 (7th Cir. 1999)
(Evans, J., dissenting).
